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The imperial power, Britain, was in a quandary over the extent of press freedom 
to allow in Nigeria, its largest black African colony, during the Second World 
War. This fundamental issue so emphasized by Allied propagandists as one of 
the freedoms for which the world was at war has not yet received scholarly 
attention and is investigated in this study. The colonial state so much 
pressurized the local press that the latter had walked a tight rope throughout the 
duration of the war.  An anti press freedom enactment which took effect on the 
declaration of war had foreshadowed the muffling of freedom of expression at a 
critical period of Nigerian history when the press was the only viable avenue 
open to colonized Nigerians to ventilate war induced grievances. This historical 
study applies the critical evaluative methodology built on archival sources, 
including the newspapers in the repositories of the Nigerian National Archives, 
Ibadan and the University of Ibadan Library to expand the cumulative 
knowledge of Nigerian media history. It concludes that the Nigerian press 
exploited loopholes in the censorship regulations, the palpable support of the 
newspaper publishers for Allied victory, and the restraining influence of the 
Colonial Office, to articulate Nigerian grievances and evade the colonial sledge 
hammer. The latter situation was only reversed when the colonial state enforced 
full press censorship after the European phase of the war as its strategy of 
stemming the rising tempo of militant nationalism in wartime Nigeria. 
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This article examines sustained attempts by the colonial state to 
muzzle press freedom in Nigeria, Britain’s largest African colony during 
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the Second World War, 1939-45 by the Imperial power .Though the war 
was largely a European affair, but Nigeria was constrained to fight in 
defence of its colonial master, despite the colony’s safe distance away 
from the war theatre. Indeed, at the onset of the Second World War in 
1939, the Nigerian press, reflecting the mood and inclination of the 
educated elite, had mobilized Nigerians to support Imperial Britain. On 
25 May 1940, the influential West Africa magazine explained that the 
Nigerian supported Britain because of his appreciation that a German 
victory “would sound the death-knell of all his legitimate aspirations,” 
including the rational expectations of the emergent elite that the end of 
hostilities would not only open up the political space but also facilitate 
their involvement in the management of Nigerian affairs. In the absence 
of a viable nationalist movement until 1944, when the National Council 
of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) was formed, the articulation of 
Nigerian political aspirations and interests during the period was 
effected through the medium of the local press (Mordi, 2009). In the 
circumstance, the imposition of press censorship had the potential to 
muzzle the expression of Nigerians’ yearnings for freedom. 
It is thus necessary to explicate the contradictions inherent in an 
emergency situation which demanded the diplomacy of a colonial power 
to harness and sustain the spontaneous loyalty of a subject population, 
but which became an occasion for the exercise of the show of force and 
defiance. Given the spontaneous support of the press and indeed 
Nigerians for Imperial Britain’s victory over Nazi Germany, why did 
officialdom adopt measures which threatened to erode the goodwill of 
Nigerians? Why and how did the press strive to sustain its freedom in 
the circumstance of wartime when the colonial state wielded enormous 
emergency powers to compel obedience to its will and policies? What 
was the impact of the concomitant mutual breach of trust and 
antagonism by the two institutions on the sustenance of the support of 
Nigerians for wartime measures in the face of evidence of racial 
discrimination? Finally, given the profound impact of the war on the 
ideology of colonialism, how successful was the colonial state in 
managing Nigerians’ yearnings for freedom, even in wartime, which 
they ventilated through the medium of the press? 
        Extant studies of Nigeria during the Second World War have 
focused on the role of Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria’s American-educated 
journalist and foremost nationalist of the World War II and post war era 
who published the famous West African Pilot in 1937, after an eventful 
journalistic stint in the Gold Coast (Jones-Quartey, 1965; Azikiwe, 1994; 
Olisa &Ikejiani-Clarke, eds.1989). Azikiwe is noted to have introduced 
“an entirely new chapter in journalism” through which he “contributed 
in a very large way towards influencing thought in Nigeria” (Ikoli, 
1950:627). Azikiwe’s journalism had thus brought for the first time “into 
the stream of national consciousness through a popular press”, elements 
who were previously “largely ignored by other leaders or else 
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underrated” (Jones-Quartey, 1965:153), and significantly spread political 
consciousness and ideas of nationalism in the Nigerian interior 
(Coleman, 1958). 
          Recent studies have sought, however, to emphasize that Nigerian 
initiative prompted Britain’s reluctant adoption of wartime propaganda 
to keep Nigerians in a war mood, but which on the long run, turned out 
to be an abysmal failure (Mordi, 2009), and led to the rigorous pursuit of 
post war propaganda as an instrument to contain surging post war 
militant nationalism in Nigeria (Mordi, 2011). The latter studies merely 
make passing references to the attempts of colonial officialdom to censor 
the press in wartime. The false impression has thus been recycled by 
scholars who have studied the press after Omu (1978), probably due to 
lack of original data, that threat to press freedom in colonial Nigeria 
ended with the seditious offences ordinance of 1876 as subsequently 
amended in 1909, 1916, 1942 and 1954, as well as the newspaper 
ordinance of 1903, amended in 1917, 1941, and 1954. These had sought to 
severely limit press freedom in colonial Nigeria by penalizing the 
preaching of hatred against the colonial government, as well as different 
classes or races in Nigeria (Agbaje, 1992; Okonkwor, 1989). 
        As a consequence, the sustained pressure of the colonial regime 
which made the press to walk a tight rope throughout the duration of 
the war remains neglected. This current enquiry helps shed some light 
on it, given Hachten’s (1971:67) generalized assertion that the activities 
of Africa’s colonial press “were often circumscribed by restraints 
imposed by colonial authorities”. Certainly, an examination of wartime 
censorship in Nigeria brings new insights into press control in important 
British colonies, and so offers a contribution to our understanding of 
both colonial government and wartime censorship.  It is thus the 
objective of this essay to expand the cumulative knowledge of Nigerian 
media history, by exploring press censorship in Nigeria during the 
Second World War. The paper seeks to argue for the proposition that the 
Nigerian press successfully resisted the censorship regulations imposed 
by British colonial overlords, until the end of the war when the colonial 
state clamped down on the Zik press in a bid to stem the rising tempo of 
nationalism, purveyed by the latter.     
  
Methodology 
       The paper adopts the critical evaluative historical methodology built 
on primary, archival sources. These include colonial government official 
publications, memoranda, reports, minutes, legislative council 
proceedings, specific enactments, censorship regulations, despatches, as 
well as newspapers which are available at the Nigerian National 
Archives, Ibadan and the University of Ibadan Library. Three national 
dailies were studied (Coker, 1965). These were Azikiwe’s West African 
Pilot, published in 1937(Azikiwe, 1994); Nigerian Youth Movement’s 
Daily Service, first published in June, 1938, as a daily organ of the body 
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(Ikoli, 1950), suspended in October, 1938 until 1June1940, when it made a 
new start, and the Nigerian Daily Times, published in 1926 by private 
Nigerian and European interests, with Ernest Ikoli as its first editor, but 
which during the war identified with Nigerian aspirations (Jose, 1987). 
Provincial newspapers “did not make any noteworthy contributions to 
the advancement of political ideas or to resolution of political 
controversies” during the period (Omu, 1978; Oduntan, 2009:27), and 
have, therefore, received no attention in this study. Of importance, 
however, are contemporary publications as well as secondary sources 
provided by peer-reviewed articles and books.  The identified sources 
were consulted and interrogated for their credibility, validity, reliability 
and relevance to the subject of enquiry. They served as the building 
block for reconstructing, explicating and writing the history of the 
subject of study, using the critical-evaluative tool of the historian which 
is built on a narrative frame work so as to clearly establish the trends and 
patterns of the episode in the historian’s evocative prose.  
 
  
Press censorship regulations during the Second World War 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the first session of the 
United Nations General Assembly, in 1946, as cited by Mendel (n.d.), 
proclaimed that freedom of expression, or broadly “Freedom of 
information is a fundamental human right and...the touchstone of all the 
freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated”(2). This freedom 
is neither absolute nor the exclusive preserve of the press, but in its early 
application was used interchangeably with the freedom of the press. It 
can be restricted by law in the overall legitimate, overriding societal 
interest, without discrimination, but inherent in it is the right to seek, 
obtain, disseminate and impart information, including that in the 
custody of public bodies, thereby promoting diversity and vitiating the 
tendency towards the concentration of media ownership in a few hands. 
Press freedom is now viewed from both constitutional and normative 
perspectives, but it is important to note that journalists’ defence against 
press censorship is hinged on their right to freedom of expression. 
Indeed, press freedom does not constitute a legal right in Britain, where 
the press is not singled out for entitlement to the enjoyment of special 
privileges distinct from those of free speech, free expression, and free 
communication. Yet, it is generally agreed that implicit in press freedom 
is the independence and freedom of all media of communication from all 
forms of direct government control (Tambini,2012). 
Ordinarily, then, the free press, which acts as a watchdog on 
kings, lords and commons, and functions as a Fourth Estate, is one that is 
free to make enquiries without legal inhibitions (Martin, 1947). But, as 
Broughton (1961) rightly observes, press freedom relates closely to the 
exercise of discretion by editors and editorial executives in limiting the 
choices they make as to “what goes in and what stays out of the 
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newspapers under their authority” (35), in deference to the dictates of 
public obligation and duty. The key concepts are thus autonomy, 
personal integrity of journalists, and media self determination in relation 
to the content of the news media, as against its determination by the 
government or the public (Twumasi, 1981). In reality, thus there are 
several impediments, even in democratic societies, notably Britain and 
the United States of America to the freedom of the press. These include 
the laws of libel, trespass, slander, contempt of court, confidence, 
copyright, of parliamentary privileges and the Official Secrets Act, which 
curtail even the ordinary citizen’s rights to free speech and to free 
enquiry (Trewin, 1975; Tebbel, 1968). Such restrictions are often seriously 
enforced in troubled times, when people in authority become obsessed 
with concerns about measures and attitudes that would not stir up 
trouble or rock the boat. 
         The Second World War years in colonial Nigeria were such 
troubled times. As expected, the colonial government enacted restrictive 
press regulations when, on 30  August 1939, barely four days to the 
outbreak of the war,  Governor Henry Bernard Bourdillon of Nigeria 
issued the Defence Regulations under the Emergency Powers 
Regulations 1939. The provisions of the regulations were derived from 
the Empire-wide Emergency Powers Colonial Defence Order in Council 
of 1939. The order was meant to be implemented simultaneously with 
Britain’s formal declaration of war against Germany. It had empowered 
His Majesty to take all necessary and expedient steps that would enable 
him to effectively and successfully prosecute the war and ensure not 
only the supply of essential services and commodities to the population 
but also secure public order and safety. The regulations contained 
drastic, comprehensive measures, with the potential to severely restrict 
press freedom in wartime Nigeria. The provisions of the regulations 
were so elastic that they could be interpreted willy-nilly to implicate the 
press.  The press was required to take measures not to contravene the 
regulations, by voluntarily submitting any matter over which it had 
doubts for pre-publication censorship.  As the West African Pilot aptly 
noted on 16 September 1944, the only option open to the press was to 
obtain the permission of the government to publish such matter without 
pre-publication censorship, and bear the consequences of its gambit. 
 Part II of the Defence Regulations, namely Censorship and the 
Control and Suppression of Publications, Writings, Plans, Photographs, 
Communications and Means of Communications, formally instituted 
press censorship in war time Nigeria, with respect to printed matter of 
all descriptions. The Chief Secretary to the Government was appointed 
the Press Censor, under who was the general control of press censorship. 
He exercised this responsibility in the colonial capital, Lagos through an 
officer deputed by him to act in his name wherever he so signified, by 
notice. The law also appointed assistant press censors for Nigeria’s 
Calabar and Owerri Provinces, where they were represented by the 
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Residents based in Calabar and Port-Harcourt, respectively to whom all 
matter printed in their respective provinces had to be submitted for 
censorship. Outside the two provinces, all printed matter meant for 
censorship had to be submitted to the press censor in Lagos. The 
regulations wholly prohibited all publications relating to military 
strategy, the conduct of war, as well as publications deemed to be 
calculated to lower troops’ morale or discipline or prejudice the 
recruiting of soldiers or encourage, or create disaffection among any 
section of the population within the colonial empire. The law permitted 
the press to voluntarily submit in triplicate to the press censors all matter 
before publication, either manuscript or in proof. The press censor 
would return his verdict in any one of three ways: 
(a) No objection seen to publication. 
(b) Responsibility for publication must rest with the publisher. 
(c) Must not be published. 
In the case of photographs or other pictorial matter, the law required that 
they be submitted in triplicate to the press censor, who was empowered 
to either “pass”, “stop”, or pass subject to blocking of some details 
believed to have the potential to give useful information to the enemy. 
The law also prohibited persons from publishing or reciting any 
statement or reports about the war made by other people, whether 
written or verbal, which were considered to have the potential to create 
alarm or despondency in the minds of those who heard or learnt of them 
(NAI, GR/ X18 Government Printer 1944 ). 
      The press accepted to be guided by these stringent regulations, 
which it considered as normal, for three reasons. First, like the Defence 
of the Realm Act of the First World War (Osuntokun, 1979), the press 
viewed the regulations in question as temporary measures that would be 
terminated at the cessation of the war which had necessitated them. 
Two, as the West African Pilot enjoined its readers on 16 September 1944, 
wars generally necessitate the sacrifice of certain liberties as part of the 
general contribution to victory. Three, the press adopted the view 
propagated by Allied propagandists that Britain was forced into the war 
to defend world freedom and democracy against Nazism, and deserved 
the support of all peoples to succeed. 
 In adopting this position, the press was encouraged by Governor 
Bourdillon’s assurance on his assumption of office as Nigeria’s colonial 
governor in 1935 which the Daily Service recalled on 13 October 1938 that 
the government would always take the people into confidence in all its 
actions. Thus the press publicized with anxiety, pronouncements of 
European dictators and other overwhelming evidence of intensive war 
preparations in Europe which had heightened tension across the globe, 
and assured the colonial authority that Nigerians were ready for the 
great sacrifice, demanded by the defence of the Empire (Mordi, 2009).  
Nigerians so publicly demonstrated their loyalty to Britain and readiness 
for sacrifice that Governor Bourdillon openly acknowledged in West 
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Africa, 25 May 1940 that Nigerian loyalty had “been continuing to make 
itself manifest to me during my three and a half years as Governor”. 
     It is important to emphasize that the press censorship regime in 
Nigeria during the Second World War derived its basis from 
developments in the metropolitan capital. One new department which 
the war brought forth in Britain in September 1939 was the Ministry of 
Information, which was saddled with the responsibility of distributing 
all information related to the war as well as with news censorship. As 
with Part II of the Censorship Regulations outlined above, the major 
plank of the metropolitan press censorship was the “principle of self-
enforcement” whereby newspapers were issued with guidelines about 
stories likely to infringe the regulations. Newspapers submitted their 
stories to the censor who scrutinised them and removed any piece of 
information which was likely to be prejudicial to the success of Allied 
military operations, and conversely of assistance to the enemy. Changes 
were indicated in blue pencil, or the story was returned with an official 
stamp as a mark of its approval for publication without any change. It 
was an offence liable to prosecution to publish a story that was not 
“Passed for Censorship”. Even reports directly emanating from the 
Ministry of Information had to be censored before their release with a 
view to striking a balance between press freedom and ‘national interest’. 
In the early stages of its implementation the policy was discredited by 
much chaos and confusion from the ministry which led a section of the 
British press to accuse the Imperial Government of acting in a Gestapo 
manner, and 30% of the British adult population to turn to Radio 
Hamburg, a Nazi propaganda outfit for information about the war. The 
aftermath of the ensuing national debate was the stripping of the 
Ministry of Information of the power to issue and censor news, a role 
that was vested in a new independent Press and Censorship Bureau. The 
BBC also became adopted as the Imperial Government’s official 
broadcast channel, often with directives on how to present news of the 
war in a positive light. A reorganised Ministry of Information improved 
relations between the government and the press, having devised a new 
censorship formula auto-imposed on editors who sought permission 
from the Censorship Division with respect to sensitive issues. Yet, 
contrary to its reputation for liberalism Britain under Winston Churchill 
suppressed ten newspapers which sought to mobilise opinion against 
the war effort (Irvin, 2014; Anton). 
 
 
Voluntary censorship  
In Nigeria, on the eve of the declaration of war in 1939, a small 
information office which was manned by an Assistant Secretary was 
established in the Nigerian Secretariat. His duty was to sort and 
distribute matter which was supplied to him by the metropolitan 
Ministry of Information. Mordi (2009) notes that a new information 
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officer was subsequently appointed to distribute, through the press and 
related channels authentic information on the progress of the war to the 
public. The enthusiasm of the press was, however, dampened by the 
negative official attitude to Nigerians’ demonstration of their willingness 
to be enlisted to fight on the side of Britain. The press alleged racial 
discrimination, and openly questioned government’s attitude, as 
captured by the Daily Service of 6 July 1940:  
 
Does the Nigerian Government regard this war as a white 
man’s affair in which the African people are required to 
take only a passive interest, or do they sincerely believe 
that the present struggle concerns black and white subjects 
of the crown alike, and that early success would depend 
upon all of us getting down grimly to the task together…? 
In all matters concerning military activities, there is a 
tendency to pass over the African as if he does not exist…  
        
Press’ allegations and complaints about racial discrimination in 
wartime Nigeria were indeed, not unfounded. In fact, racial 
discrimination tended to permeate every facet of the colonial state. Thus 
a wartime instruction issued to white troops in West Africa emphasized 
the need to preserve white superiority: “The British are looked up to, put 
on a very high level. Don’t bring that level down by undue familiarity”. 
Killingray (2010) further shows that “Race was a determining element in 
the command and order of the British African colonial forces” (84). The 
press had adopted the position that the relaxation of the old fashioned 
imperialist rule which forbade the white official from fraternizing with 
the Africans would help rather than destroy the white man’s prestige. So 
too, would the scrapping of  such obvious disparities institutionalized as 
“European post” , “European Quarters” , “European Hospital” , “African 
Surveyors” , “African Hospital” , etc, that tended “to make more acute 
the wave of racial antagonism” .The press, though not unmindful of 
government’s ban on open discussion of the issue of racial 
discrimination, chose to bring the matter to the notice of Nigeria’s new, 
58-year-old Governor Arthur Frederick Richards, who was inaugurated 
in office in December, 1943. This was given the fact, as aptly editorialized 
by the Daily Service, on 5 January 1944, that the “deepening sense of 
mutual contempt of colour is the greatest single disruptive factor to the 
British Commonwealth of Nations”. 
  In spite of this overwhelming evidence of racial discrimination in 
wartime Nigeria, government sought to discredit media reports of them 
as half-baked and ill-digested , and designed to give direct help to the 
enemy. Consequently, government reminded editors of their duty under 
the Emergency Regulations, to submit to the system of voluntary 
censorship as was the practice in England, or in the alternative, compel 
government to enforce  censorship before publication. Government did 
‐106‐ 
 
not enforce pre-publication censorship because, in the words of a Daily 
Service editorial of 5 January 1944, it “will be a great nuisance to the 
Government”, and “a greater nuisance still to the proprietors of the 
newspapers” who should accept responsibility if the law had to be 
enforced in future. 
Government’s reluctance to enforce full pre-publication 
censorship derived from the fact that the publishers of the newspapers 
were fully supportive of the war, which they had clearly demonstrated 
in the columns of their newspapers. The press had adopted the view that 
it would be totally wrong to misconstrue the legitimate complaints 
against the acts of indiscretion of a very tiny fraction of European 
officials as inciting racial ill-will in Nigeria, given what the Daily Service 
of 26 August 1940 aptly described as “expressions of unreserved loyalty 
and burning desire” of the publishers of the newspapers “to support the 
government to the limit of their ability and resources in the general war 
effort”. 
    Besides, both the press and the colonial government appreciated 
the need for some moderation. The press was conscious of its role as 
watchdog and medium of education and enlightenment, even in 
wartime. This placed a responsibility on it to call attention to actions of 
any “blundering official” that could create resentment of government 
actions. The West African Pilot of 22 June 1944 thus enjoined government 
officials to welcome “…fair, honest and well intentioned criticism”, 
rather than drive underground discontent which would “break out later 
in more virulent form”. Above all, the press was committed to its higher 
obligation to serve the highest interest of thousands of helpless, 
inarticulate colonial subjects who looked up to it to protect, uphold and 
champion their cause. To fail in such a duty, editorialized the Daily 
Service of 30 January 1941, would amount to “the greatest crime of our 
age”. On this score, the press was not ready for compromise. H.O 
Davies, NYM Secretary General made the point so explicitly in his 
regular column in the Daily Service of 28 August 1940: “As for us, our 
path is beaten,-Victory for the Commonwealth, justice and progress for 
our people, and truth, at whatever cost”. 
       A balancing act was thus called forth on the part of the press, and 
the colonial state. First, in order not to breach the censorship regulations, 
and provide the press censor with an opportunity to wield his “heavy 
blue pencil” against their newspapers, Azikiwe  in his Inside Stuff 
column in the West African Pilot of 4 March 1940 disclosed that editors 
devised ways of being “very discreet” in the discharge of their duties. 
They did so by allowing their subordinates to oversee the affairs of 
newspapers, while they travelled out of their duty posts. A notable 
example was Nnamdi Azikiwe, who left the Pilot, off and on, in charge of 
his lieutenants, trained by him. Some of them were “able to hold the 
forte, as best as they could, during my short respite and absence”. A 
corollary to this is for the editor to avoid punishment by currying favour 
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and reward from the establishment, in return for diluting the pungency 
of his editorials, or simply omitting, distorting, and adopting “rhetorical 
devices” rather than reporting contentious issues in obvious 
acquiescence to self-censorship(Lee,1998:57). Thus during the war 
Azikiwe, the publisher and editor of the Pilot, as well as executive 
committee members of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), 
publishers of the Daily Service, including H.O. Davies (Business Manager 
of the newspaper  and NYM Secretary General up to 1941),Ernest 
Ikoli(NYM President, and editor of the newspaper up to 1943) ,and 
Samuel Ladoke  Akintola(editor of the newspaper from 1943 to the end 
of the war) enjoyed sundry favours from the colonial state, with dire 
consequences for the credibility of their newspapers(Mordi, 
2008,2009,2011,2012). 
       Second, Azikiwe further disclosed in his popular Inside Stuff  
column in the West African Pilot of 18 March 1940 that editors were 
constrained to choose between publishing information about the war or 
war news based on “the ‘handouts’ which the Ministry of Information 
and the British Official Wireless Service release to different Newspapers 
of the Colonial Empire,” and remaining silent. However, these were so 
“standardized and stereotyped” that the newspaper became dry and 
drab ,in spite of the facilities available to the press to gather news from 
across the globe, because editors considered the official handout 
“nothing of consequence to report”. The colonial government also 
tended to slow down the proliferation of newspapers outside its control 
during the period, using the newsprint weapon as a form of disguised 
censorship. To this end, a law which banned the importation of 
newsprint was brought into being in 1941(Government Printer 1941, 
Control). Governor Bourdillon applied the law in 1942, to decline 
approval to Azikiwe’s request for permission to publish newspapers in 
Kano, Ibadan and Jos, in spite of his readiness to make an alternative 
arrangement to import newsprint without offending the Defence 
Regulations.  The government had attributed its decision to the shortage 
of newsprint, arising from “heavy American war insurance risks and 
increased production costs” which led to “increase in the prices of 
newsprint” (CSO 1/32, Ending December 1942). Yet, as the West African 
Pilot complained on 24 June 1944 government published its own 
newspaper during the period , the Nigeria Review, “fully funded by 
government”, and “relying neither on sales nor advertisements”. It was a 
medium to disseminate war news, whose annual circulation figure 
increased from its initial 480,000 in 1942 to 1,497,150 in 1945 despite 
newsprint scarcity (Mordi, 2009:245). In spite of this, newsprint 
regulation remained in force for the Nigerian press, even long after the 
war, until 1948, when control was temporarily removed from all types of 




     Outright prohibition of publication of news and information, or 
directives to editors “supplied personally and confidentially” (CSO 1/32 
December, 1942), to desist from further publication of news or review of 
certain publications in the press, also characterized the regime of press 
censorship in wartime Nigeria. For instance, the workers’ strike of 
1941/42, to press for the award of cost of living allowance (C.O.L.A.) and 
a general wage review to cushion the effect of war induced inflation on 
them, attracted drastic actions against the press and M. A.O. Imoudu, 
leader of the Railway Workers’ Union (Oyemakinde, 1974), for 
supporting and actively participating in the workers’ action. On 23 
January 1942, the governor restricted Imoudu from Lagos to Auchi in 
Kukuruku Division of the Benin Province, a distance of 441 kilometres, 
and as the West African Pilot disclosed on 30 September 1944 forbade the 
press from publishing any news or comment about the restriction. The 
restriction of Imoudu thus preceded the governor’s publication of a 
Gazette on 4 February 1942, conferring on him power to prohibit and 
penalize publications about labour unrest, food shortages and related 
issues, which he had cause to believe might raise the morale of the 
enemy, provided he obtained a certificate from the Chief Secretary to the 
Government as proof of his belief. The governor’s opinion thereby 
usurped the power conferred on the courts by the Nigeria General 
Regulations of September 1941 to determine such prosecutions (Mordi, 
2002:22). 
           Also prohibited at the onset of the war were all publications and 
records of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society (Government 
Printer, 1940). In 1941, the government enforced this prohibition order 
and seized and confiscated all publications of the group which were 
already in circulation in Nigeria on the grounds that they contained 
“seditious and subversive propaganda” (Council Debates, 24th Session 
1946).The prohibition was enforced throughout the duration of the war, 
even though some colonial administrators had viewed Jehovah’s 
Witnesses as “Harmless fanatics”. The enforcement could be due to the 
group’s indiscretion in wartime of putting “God higer (sic) than the 
State” and committing itself to “oneness of mind and purpose and 
devotion to…God’s kingdom and its righteousness” in its fight “for the 
New World and its interests”, rather than for the victory of Britain and 
its allies over Germany (W.R. Brown to Denton, 29/6/44, No. 56). 
         The governor, in September 1944, also barred the press from 
further serializing a pamphlet, which in obvious reference to the 
exploitative and discriminatory activities of European firms operating 
under the canopy of the Association of West African Merchants 
(AWAM) had been critical of a tendency towards a virtual monopoly in 
Nigeria. Of the activities of the AWAM, Coleman(1958) has observed 
that the  “near-totality of economic power exercised by a small group of 
European firms, together with apparent governmental support  or 
toleration of that power, gave rise to a popular image of alien collusion 
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and exploitation” (81).  A similar image of collusion could be seen in the 
King’s College Incident, when the government instructed the press never 
to make any comment on the arrest and arraignment of 75 students of 
King’s College, Lagos, who had protested at the conditions of their 
school’s temporary accommodation, in 1944.Though the magistrate court 
subsequently dismissed the case, but the colonial authorities conscripted 
eight of the boys into the army(Killingray,2010:50).One of the student-
conscripts, Samuel Oparaocha had subsequently died at the Enugu 
Army Hospital, in Nigeria’s colonial Eastern Provinces, and generated 
controversies (Niven to Akintola, 1944, No. 56/382). 
       The West African Pilot on 16 September 1944 thus rightly 
wondered how publication of news or comments on these issues could 
be reasonably said to “affect the security of Nigeria, speaking from a 
military point of view”, but to no effect. Such complaints from the press 
over government infractions on their freedom, notwithstanding, editors  
often consulted the Public Relations Officer when  in doubt as to the 
advisability of publishing certain articles, and they invariably took the 
advice they were given. In the cases of the King’s College incident and 
the Imoudu restriction they complied with the directive to refrain from 
comment, even though they subsequently suggested that the news had 
been suppressed (Oyo Prof 2/3 No. 60/1944). 
      Government’s frequent threats to amend, or enforce the censorship 
regulations, and the focus of such threats and amendments on the 
capacity of information purveyed by the press to excite racial ill will and 
ill feeling, and boost the morale of the enemy reflected government’s 
sensitivity to the issue of racial discrimination. Though it enjoyed official 
backing, the colonial government was most uncomfortable about racial 
discrimination being publicized on the pages of newspapers.  Certainly, 
the colonial authorities were anxious to shield the subject population 
from the effect of hearing “the denunciations of the methods of their 
colonial rulers from German propaganda and attacks on the British by 
the Vichy French” (Crowder, 1974:611), which emanated from American 
and Soviet sources. In furtherance of this, the colonial government of 
Nigeria, apart from the enactments in question, distributed a list of do’s 
and don’ts to the press, which the Daily Service of 18 June 1940 duly 
publicized, notably:  
 
Don’t pay attention to any news that is not official and 
therefore not authentic. Don’t be misled by anything you 
hear in justification of Nazi or Fascist methods. The 
reaction “But there’s something in what they say” is the 
reaction they want. It’s attitude of mind they are trying to 
induce. Do leave your disputes and your agitations for 
change until after the war. Criticism of a government in 




         The governor’s sensitivity to press comments and reports could 
also be attributed to the nationalist sentiments, which the press thereby 
purveyed and encouraged. The war had exploded old myths about the 
invincibility of Imperial Britain and about racial superiority, and opened 
the eyes of the colonized to the possibility of self government.  The fall of 
Malaya had “struck a severe blow to white prestige throughout the non-
European world” (Coleman, 1958:231), and cast serious doubts about the 
capability of Imperial Britain to defend and protect its African subjects. 
So precarious was the British military position in the Far East that not 
only did African troops rally to the support, if not rescue of the 
embattled imperial power but also “for the first time the administration 
appealed for the loyalty of their subjects rather than assumed it for 
granted”.  Indeed “The myth of British imperial invincibility was 
shattered in the eyes of educated Africans with the conquest of Britain’s 
Far Eastern colonies by the Japanese, a coloured race”. Also, “forever 
shattered” was “White supremacy, coupled with the hitherto monolithic 
structure of colonial rule” (Crowder, 1976:612). Africans were, in fact, 
rudely awakened to the fact that self-government could be won, even if 
constitutionally. The colonial government, in such circumstances, 
refrained from taking any drastic action against their newspapers.  
 
The restraining influence of the Colonial Office  
The colonial regime, especially under Sir Bernard Bourdillon 
would seem to have acted within the ambit of laid down policy in its 
frequent threats and actual attempts to censor reports of acts of racial 
discrimination. Similar reports were censored in the United States of 
America, and in other parts of the British Empire. The rationale was to 
discredit the impression that “racial discrimination was the policy of the 
Empire”, and received official endorsement. It was feared that too much 
focus on incidents of racial discrimination could not be “calculated to 
improve relations between Africans and Europeans”, in Nigeria, where 
majority of the people were illiterate and not exposed beyond the “hills 
around their villages” (Denton, 1/140 No. 103, 1940).  
           Indeed, government tended to exaggerate the influence of the 
power of the written word purveyed by the press on Africans, and 
hinged its hypersensitivity to press criticisms of racial discrimination on 
the susceptibility of ignorant Africans to believe everything in print.  The 
argument, as articulated by the Nigerian Daily Times on 17 June 1938, 
seems to be that “the power of the press is in inverse ratio to the literacy 
of the public” such that “The more unenlightened the people are, the 
greater is their belief in the written word”. In this assertion, the 
contradiction inherent in the narrative of illiterates reading and believing 
the written word is lost sight of. The West African Pilot on 21 September 
1938 thus objected to “a wholesale condemnation of educated and 
intelligent African men and women …as ‘semi-educated’ and ‘semi-
literate’, despite their academic and professional qualifications in Europe 
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and America”. The European was thereby encouraged in “the 
assumption of airs of superiority to the African”.  Omu (1968) dates this 
tendency to the end of the First World War, when colonial authorities 
strove to curb press freedom because of their assumption that the written 
word could inflame Africans to undermine “the basis of colonial power” 
(280), despite the evidence that “people as a rule attend to 
communications not… to learn something or reconsider their own 
philosophies of life …” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15:36-45).  
         Besides, the evidence does not support the suggestion that high 
level of illiteracy is a justification for the enforcement of press 
censorship, which is also imposed even in the most literate, democratic 
countries of the world. For instance, the act of “managed news”, leading 
to “credibility gap” in the United States of America is “as old as the 
federal government itself” and has pervaded all administrations 
(Krieghbaum, 1968:59). In fact, press censorship is no respecter of 
literacy, ethnicity or race.  Rather, as Basowitz (cited by Stein, 1968) aptly 
observes, press censorship is partly induced by a feeling of guilt about 
our inability to resolve certain problems, whose existence we then seek 
to deny. Since “The communications media, in reporting the news, 
confronts us with the continual presence of these problems and thus 
become agents which disturb the tranquillity for which we yearn” (77), 
they are censored. 
      Thus Governor Bourdillon strained to assure Lord Moyne, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies in September 1941 that his threats against the 
press in Nigeria were not politically motivated, but followed laid down 
procedures in the United Kingdom of censoring press material, to 
prevent leakage of information and suppress rumour mongering. Lord 
Moyne  had consequently directed the government, when dealing with 
reports of racial discrimination in Nigeria  in future  to  impose 
censorship , as a last resort , and with the prior approval of the Colonial 
Office, after the failure of the informal approach (Moyne to Sir Bernard 
Bourdillon, 22 September 1941) .The West African Pilot on 14 March 1942,  
thus focused on the position of the British House of Commons that even 
if  the personal approach failed, and constant evasion of the regulations 
by the press warranted the enforcement of censorship regulations, the  
governor needed to exercise a very liberal discretion. By implication, the 
Colonial Office and the British parliament would not approve of the 
reckless enforcement of press censorship, even in wartime. 
        Governor Bourdillon complied with the Secretary of State’s directive 
and adopted the informal approach in relating with the press through 
press conferences, a well known instrument of media control. The 
Information Office had instituted regular, weekly “informal Saturday 
chat” with a view to establishing “friendly and regular relations with the 
press”. Unfortunately, the experiment was abandoned after a period of 
four weeks during which “nobody turned up at all” (NAI, CSO1/32, 
Ending December, 1942).  Press conferences were subsequently 
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inaugurated in 1941, with the hope of Nigerian officialdom to “achieve 
something useful” by providing newspaper editors with the opportunity 
of discussing difficulties or points they wanted explained, both  about 
the war  and Nigerian affairs, generally. Government officials had 
sought, by this means “to cash in on the apparent willingness of the 
editors to be reasonable at an informal discussion …” to gain their 
cooperation. However, editors refused to be influenced such that 
“whatever was said or agreed or explained in the informal discussions 
made not the slightest difference to what was written in the papers”. 
Press conferences were subsequently suspended by the government 
which considered them “useless”. Instead, the colonial regime weighed 
the option of bringing the press “to book for their offences” by way of “a 
few healthy fines” (Denton, 1943, No. 103). It is noteworthy that the 
American press had reacted in a similar manner when Woodrow Wilson 
instituted “the first regular formal Washington press conferences,” 
leading to his complaint that a majority of the press corps took more 
interest “in the personal and the trivial rather than in principles and 
policies” (Krieghbaum, 1968:59). 
       It suffices to note that persistent demands by Nigerian colonial 
administrators on government to control the press, and allow officers to 
institute suits for libel and slander, arising from scurrilous and 
inaccurate articles about them could not sway adherence to the Colonial 
Office’s directives. Instead, government declared that, other than “its 
powers of persuasion”, it could not “compel articles to be submitted for 
censorship before publication” (Hoskyns-Abrahall, No. 60/1944).  
Government disallowed individual officers to institute libel cases against 
the press because articles which appeared libellous might on closer 
examination turn out not to be so. In fact, the loopholes in the 
regulations made them so “difficult more precisely to define”, and “not 
easy to secure sound foundation for action”, so journalists could easily 
circumvent pre-publication censorship (Howe, 21/11/44, C 227 Vol. V).             
      Indeed, under the restraining influence and ever watchful eyes of 
the Colonial Office, rigorous press censorship could not be enforced in 
Nigeria during the war years. At any rate the press recognized the 
enormous powers conferred on the governor by the Emergency 
Regulations to severely restrict press freedom, and therefore submitted 
to the system of voluntary censorship. It thus strove to conduct itself in 
such a way as not to be rash and tactless so that, as the Daily Service of 18 
August 1941 noted, it would not “cause any necessity for official 
restriction of any kind on our work”. This included sending a deputation 
to the governor and apologizing to aggrieved groups for offending 
editorials, as was done by the publishers of the Daily Service in 1941. The 
Daily Service noted on 8 February 1941 that the governor also duly 
appreciated the importance of “excellent relations between the Press and 
the Government”, and merely admonished offending newspapers “to go 
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and sin no more”. He thereby secured the cooperation of “even Editors 
of the most rabid type”.  
       In effect, as in the three decades before the Second World War, the 
Nigerian press of the World War II era functioned effectively as the main 
“vehicle of public opinion and the medium of political pressure and 
propaganda” because, as in the period before World War II, “those who 
owned and edited them were actively engaged in politics” (Omu, 
1974:521-39; Twumasi, 1974:499-501). Besides, as Shaloff (1972) shows 
with respect to Ghana between 1933 and 1939, the evidence supports the 
suggestion that in Nigeria during World War II, the Colonial Office and 
the local administration were seldom in agreement on the question of 
restricting the freedom of the African press. 
 
Threat of militant nationalism and  recourse to   enforcement of  press  
censorship 
The seldom agreement between the Colonial Office and the 
Nigerian Government to restrict the freedom of the press was reached in 
1945, when the subtle application of the censorship regulations, under 
the administration of Henry Bernard Bourdillon (1935-1943) , gave way 
to rabid intolerance of criticism and severe enforcement of press 
censorship during the governorship of Arthur Frederick Richards(1943-
1947). The government  prohibited the publication and printing of the 
West African Pilot and the Daily Comet, leading members of the Zik 
Group, between 8 July  and  14August 1945. At the end of the European 
phase of the Second World War, the Nigerian Government had revoked 
the censorship regulations with effect from 10 May 1945 (Gazette No. 
29). However, government re-imposed the regulations on 4 July 1945, 
barely two weeks into a Nigerian workers’ general strike, which lasted 
for three months from 21 June 1945. The strike arose from government’s 
failure to fulfil its promise in 1942, to grant a wage review that would 
reflect the cost of living index. Both the West African Pilot and the Daily 
Comet had justified the workers’ action, and enjoined the government to 
be flexible in dealing with the issue (Azikiwe, 1994).Instead, the 
government had blamed them for publishing false statements attributed 
to the Public Relations Officer which the government believed had 
rubbished its efforts to persuade the workers to end the strike (Public 
Notice No. 140). 
       Azikiwe (1994) deployed his professional experience to 
successfully neutralize the effects of the ban on his newspapers, and 
further alleged that he had uncovered government’s plot to assassinate 
him. He thereby attracted international attention, and local, popular 
sympathy. The Nigerian public had not the faintest idea about 
government’s real reasons for banning the publication of the affected 
newspapers because government was given to too much confidentiality: 
“too enamoured of the metaphor of a mailed fist in a velvet glove”, and 
thereby left the impression that “the Government will not tolerate the 
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criticism of enlightened Africans seeking the progress of Nigeria” 
(Stanfield, June 1945). Government also declined to renew Azikiwe’s 
Class B Wireless Licence because his claim that the materials provided 
by Reuters formed the basis of his allegation of government’s plot to 
assassinate him was proved to be baseless (Government Printer, 1946, 
24th Session: 13). 
      The government further prohibited all its functionaries, including 
Native Administrations from placing government advertisements or 
notices in all papers in the stable of the Zik Group, with effect from 16 
October 1945. The Pilot’s privilege of being represented at the Press Table 
of the Nigeria Legislative Council, was also revoked for distorting the 
governor’s threat to dismiss workers if they participated in future 
strikes, as well as his assurance that Azikiwe had “nothing more 
substantial to fear than the dark shadows of his own imagination” 
(Government Printer, 1946, 23rd Session: 9). The Pilot and Comet  had 
conveyed the erroneous impression “that the Government took a very 
lenient view about the strikers’ action and about the alleged attempt 
made by certain section of the community to assassinate a journalist 
during the memorable strike” . The governor rescinded his order on 9 
January 1946, when “the paper published a suitable apology”, but 
insisted that until Azikiwe effected “a radical change in his editorial 
method” he did not “consider that Government’s attitude towards his 
group of papers should be changed” (Richards to Hall, 1946). The 
colonial government was alarmed over the rising popularity of the 
papers of the Zik Group because despite official claim that they engaged 
in a deliberate “campaign of misrepresentations against administrative 
officers” with an overwhelming “cumulative effect” (Senior Resident 
Warri, 1944, No. W.P.4227/81), “their readers have implicit faith in the 
truth of all they publish” (Resident Benin, 1944, No. 14).   
    Consequently, Governor Richards resolved “to go for Azikiwe” 
(Pearce, 1981:298), and instituted a libel suit against one of the vibrant 
editors of the Zik Group of newspapers.  A Daily Comet editorial of 9 
November 1945, had  urged the Colonial Office to investigate  
Bourdillon, “a poor under-salaried official” for allegedly having so 
corruptly enriched himself during his tenure as Nigeria’s governor that 
he was worth “over well nigh a million pounds”. The editor of the 
newspaper, Anthony Enahoro(1965),  who was subsequently jailed for 
criminal libel,  attributes his conviction to government’s strategy to check 
the slide to civil disobedience, spearheaded by newspaper editors in 
Nigeria. There was evidence, however, that the editors of the Zik Group 
had decided to give the “fullest editorial support” and thereby exploit 
the workers’ agitation of 1945 to further the aims of Nigerian 
nationalism. Enahoro had consequently established contact with the 
workers and conferred with Herbert Macaulay, president of the NCNC 
for the purpose of exploiting the “political possibilities” offered by the 
workers’ strike by encouraging them to “hold out to the bitter end” , so 
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as to merge Nigeria’s political with economic struggles. Government 
effort to checkmate the Zik Group by requiring the West African Pilot and 
the Daily Comet to submit their editorials for official censorship before 
publication was rebuffed. Instead of complying, the two newspapers 
appeared without editorials but with odd quotations designed to 
infuriate the governor:  
BENEATH THE RULE OF MAN ENTIRELY GREAT, THE PEN IS 
MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD – EDWARD BULWER-LYTTON  
THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS IS THE PALLADIUM OF CIVIL, 
POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS - JUNIUS (pp. 79-81). 
 
However, Azikiwe (1994), Enahoro’s employer attributes the latter’s 
ordeal “mainly to inexperience”, and “the impetuosity of youth egged on 
by patriots”, as well as “ignorance of the fine points of the law of libel”. 
These had made Enahoro “to be decoyed into publishing…criminal 
libel” against Bourdillon who was generally acclaimed to be “a very 
considerate, humane and reasonable person and a friend of the African” 
(302-303; Azikiwe, 1978:2-3). 
Obviously, the end of the Second World War, without palpable 
signs of movement towards colonial freedom had tended to favour the 
rise of militant nationalism in Nigeria. Governor Richards’ appointment 
from Jamaica, where he had a record of high handedness in dealing with 
the educated elite was a clear indication that Britain was not prepared 
for a peaceful transfer of power soon after the war, thereby igniting 
Nigeria’s militant nationalism. The Zik press constituted the instrument 
which, along with the NCNC and organized labour sought to merge 
economic with political grievances (Mordi, 2011), to launch Nigeria on 
the road to independence. In this regard, the press had derived much 
inspiration from India, which the Nigerian Daily Times of 11 August 1942 
publicized the demands of its nationalists for immediate British 
withdrawal,  and thereby focused world attention on the vast colony and 
dazzled the imagination of the emergent Nigerian elite . Consequently, 
the West African Pilot which on 13 July 1942 demanded for a democratic 
Nigeria, on 14 July 1942 expressed a firm belief that “The day of vast 
empire is past” while “The day of equal peoples is at hand”. Thus editors 
generally splashed stories which they knew to be tendentiously distorted 
and inaccurate in order not only to boost the circulation of their 
newspapers but also to project themselves as “young African crusaders 




 At the onset of the Second World War which Allied propagandists 
had proclaimed was driven by the zeal to defeat Nazism and its inherent 
doctrine of racial superiority, Imperial Britain imposed checks on the 
freedom of expression through censorship regulations that foreboded the 
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muzzling of press freedom in wartime Nigeria.  The censorship 
regulations had derived its origin and impetus from metropolitan 
Britain, where it had been formulated and dutifully applied, culminating 
in the ban on the publication of ten newspapers in the early years of the 
war. A peculiar Ministry of Information had been established in the 
metropolitan capital on the declaration of war and saddled with the 
responsibility of distributing war news and of news censorship. The 
chaos and confusion that characterized the implementation of its 
unusual mandate had made the ministry and imperial government the 
butt of accusations of Gestapo tactics from a section of the press, 
culminating in the establishment of an independent Censorship Bureau 
in the metropolitan capital. The regime of press censorship which was 
imposed in the metropole was extended to colonial Nigeria, with an 
information officer employed to ensure its enforcement.  
The comprehensive press censorship regulations which heralded 
the onset of the Second World War and presaged a regime of severe 
press censorship in Nigeria was , therefore, a mere application of an 
Empire-wide policy to the colony and protectorate of Nigeria. The 
evidence shows that the severe censorship and rabid intolerance of 
freedom of expression foreboded by the regulations did not materialize 
until the end of the European phase of the war when a section of the 
Nigerian press had sought to exploit economic grievances to mobilize 
Nigerians for militant nationalism. The Nigerian press had viewed the 
regulations as a necessary sacrifice for the defeat of Nazism, but 
exercised some measure of freedom to criticize government policies 
throughout the duration of the war, while submitting to self-censorship 
and complying with official directives not to publish sensitive 
information. It thereby sought to demystify the colonial state and its 
philosophical underpinning of racial superiority. In its discharge of this 
function, the press largely successfully resisted official attempts to 
influence or dictate the content of the news media. Conversely, official 
reactions to the press’ exercise of its privileged freedom, even in wartime 
were largely within the bounds of the universally accepted principle that 
the exercise of any right must be in conformity with the law.  The 
dexterity with which the press resisted and circumvented the provisions 
of the law; and the restraining influence of the Colonial Office 
safeguarded press freedom during the period, notwithstanding 
Governor Richards’ punitive actions against the Zik Group, late in 1945 
when the British Empire and indeed the free world were celebrating the 
defeat of Nazism. It is hoped that the current study of wartime 
censorship has brought new insights to the intriguing subject of press 
controls in important British colonies, and offers a new perspective of 
British press censorship in Britain and its colonies in periods of 
emergencies, particularly during the Second World War, using the 
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